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Abstract 
 
Starting from the new institutionalist premise of the differential receptivity of organisations 
to change, this essay examines the French administrative reform process between 1989-97. 
The two key reforms undertaken during this period both sought to delegate greater 
managerial autonomy to the ministerial field service level. We undertook semi-structured 
interviews with officials in the field services of three French ministries (Education, 
Agriculture and Infrastructure) in the Champagne-Ardennes region, as well as with 
members of the wider policy communities. The capacity of the field services to adopt a 
proactive approach to management reform depended on five key variables: internal 
organisational dynamics; the attitude of the central services to meso-level autonomy; the 
degree of institutional receptivity to change;  the type of service delivery, and the extent of 
penetration in local networks.  The Infrastructure Ministry was more receptive to 
management change than either Education or (especially) Agriculture, a receptivity that 
reflects the institutional diversity of the French administrative system, and that supports 
new institutionalist arguments.  The essay rejects straightforward convergence to the NPM 
norm. Though the direction of change is rather similar in France to comparable countries, 
changes in public management norms require either endogenous discursive shifts or else 
need to be interpreted in terms of domestic registers that are acceptable or understandable to 
those charged with implementing reform.  
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Since the 1980s, the administrative reform agenda of OECD countries has been subjected to 
the growing influence of managerial ideas and practices which has been collectively 
referred to as ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) (Aucoin 1990; Wright 1994a; Ridley 
1996). The attraction of such managerial concepts has been attributed to the financial 
constraints incurred as a result of the economic downturn in Western Europe since the 
1970s and the subsequent need to contain public expenditure (Ridley, 1996). NPM 
advocates an end to the dichotomy between the public and private sectors and the 
deployment of private sector practices to improve the efficiency of public administration 
(Hood, 1994). This method places a greater emphasis on outputs and the attainment of 
results rather than an adherence to the general rules of procedure, which typified the 
traditional approach to public administration.  
 
Hood (1991) identifies the following seven doctrines as comprising the NPM agenda: 
  hands on professional management with public managers being given managerial 
autonomy and held accountable for their actions  the definition of targets and the evaluation of the service’s performance in terms 
of meeting those targets  greater emphasis on output controls with resources being allocated on the basis of 
results achieved  a shift to a disaggregation of units with centralised structures broken up into 
smaller manageable units   the introduction of greater competition within the public sector to encourage 
higher standards at lower costs   an emphasis on private sector styles of managerial practices   a stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use in order to encourage 
public sector bodies to maximise their use of dwindling public resources. 
 
The fact that many of the NPM doctrines featured in the respective administrative reform 
agendas in OECD countries led to claims of a new global paradigm in public management. 
Aucoin (1990) and Osborne and Gaebler (1992) both suggest that there is a move towards a 
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more entrepreneurial model of government amongst OECD countries to enable a more 
effective response to recent socio-economic developments and the challenges of today’s 
world. In facing similar pressures for change, these authors argue that there will be a degree 
of institutional convergence in terms of countries being inclined to imitate each other.   
Predictions of the emergence of a global paradigm have been criticised, however, on the 
grounds that they do not take into account a country’s institutional traditions (Wright 1994; 
Ridley 1996). The influence of institutional arrangements on a country’s receptivity to 
change constitutes part of the new institutionalist approach to studying organisations. New 
institutionalism comprises a multi-theoretical approach to the study of institutions and 
organisational change and focuses on the way in which institutions embody values and 
power relationships (Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes 1996; Lowndes, 2001).  
 
The aim of this paper is to establish whether the French administrative reform process 
undertaken between 1989 and 1997 can be categorised as convergent with the model 
outlined by Hood (1991); whether case-specific factors need to be incorporated into the 
convergence model, or whether convergent pressures produce discordant organisational 
responses. To prove the convergence hypothesis, we would need to demonstrate the 
capacity of the ministerial field service managers to engage in an autonomous reform 
process that falls within the general framework of reforms introduced in the majority of 
OECD countries. To refute the convergence hypothesis, we would need to demonstrate the 
reverse: namely a refusal on behalf of the field services to accept new managerial reforms, 
experienced as alien to accepted modes of appropriate behaviour. In either case we concur 
with Dreyfus (2002) that a micro-organisational analysis is required to understand 
organisational change and behaviour at this level. 
 
To address these related questions, we undertook extensive fieldwork investigations into the 
effects of the 1989-92 Public Service Renewal and the 1995-97 Reform of the State 
programmes.  Prior to considering the impact of the reform programmes, we will provide 
overview of the main institutional features of the French administrative system, the 
pressures for reform and how these underpinned the 1989-97 French administrative reform 
process. 
 
The French Administrative System and Reforms 
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The French administrative system has its origins in the Napoleonic model of administration 
where it was viewed as a force that would embody the power and legitimacy of the French 
state and the general interest of the nation as a whole (Stevens, 1996). This resulted in the 
establishment of a centralised and hierarchical administrative system which intervened in 
all aspects of the socio-economic life of the French nation (Knapp and Wright, 2001). Such 
state interventionism manifested itself in dirigisme, a statist pattern of decision making 
involving the state taking direct charge of the political and economic agendas and 
overseeing the implementation of public policy with minimal input from business interests 
(Schmidt, 1996). The dirigiste tradition has declined since the 1980s, a by-product of the 
globalisation of world markets, deregulation and the rise of consumerism (Schmidt 1996; 
Levy 1999; Hall 2001). In spite of this, senior French civil servants continue to view 
themselves as agents of state power who derive their legitimacy from defending an 
impartial and legalistic conception of state intervention against particularistic interests 
(Rouban 1995).  The senior civil servants are members of the most prestigious 
administrative grades, the grands corps. The grands corps are traditionally classified as the 
three administrative grands corps comprising the Council of State, the Finance Inspectorate 
and the Court of Accounts, as well as the two technical corps of the Mining Corps and the 
Bridges and Highways Corps. These grands corps derive their authority either from their 
technical expertise (the Mining and the Bridges and Highways Corps), or from their 
location at the heart of the French administration (Kessler 1994). 
 
The French notion of public service (service public) provides the foundation for the 
operational principles of the French administrative system and the rights and obligations of 
its officials (Clark 2000, Cole 2000).  The doctrine of service public is used to refer to the 
terms and conditions of service of public officials as enshrined in the civil service code, 
Statut général de la Fonction publique, created in 1946. The code outlines the process by 
which an individual can become a public official,  as well as stipulating the terms and 
conditions of service once that status has been acquired. From this perspective, service 
public provides a logic of appropriateness for the organisational behaviour of officials in 
discharging their responsibilities. The public sector trade unions have defended vigorously 
the traditional French notion of public service, requiring governments to proceed cautiously 
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when considering proposals to revise the terms and conditions of service of public officials 
(Claisse 1993, Siwek-Pouydesseau 1996, Chevallier 2003).  
 
The French public policy literature identifies a set of challenges to the orthodox model of 
public policy-making from the 1980s onwards. Traditionally compartmentalised, inward-
looking and procedural, the French administrative system has been subjected to a variety of 
pressures for change, of which European integration,  decentralisation and the influence of 
changing management norms are identified by Muller (1992, 2000) as the key drivers. 
Growing European integration has increased pressures for greater inter-ministerial co-
operation. Though French ministries remain highly compartmentalised (Smith, 2004), there 
are pressures to adopt a more joined-up approach to European issues (Lequesne, 1993). The 
EU principle of subsidiarity, which stipulates that decisions should be taken at the lowest 
possible, has provided impetus for greater autonomy to be delegated to the subnational 
levels, especially the regions, regional field services and prefectures (Oberdorff, 1992). 
Furthermore, the drive to achieve the convergence criteria for economic and monetary 
union has resulted in cost saving measures being taken to reduce public expenditure. In this 
way, the effects of Europeanisation have influenced the French administrative reform 
agenda. 
 
The 1982-83 decentralisation reforms have had a much more direct impact upon the 
operation of the field services. The 1982-3 reforms provided local authorities - the 22 
mainland regions, 96 départements and 36,500 communes - with an opportunity to develop 
their own expertise and to establish their own structures capable of delivering policies in 
accordance with the expectations of the local populace. The reforms thus marked a shift in 
the French administrative tradition, insofar as state representatives in the ministerial field 
services and the prefectures could no longer claim a monopoly over the provision of 
technical expertise and the implementation of public policies (de Montricher, 1995). The 
influence that the ministerial field services were able to exert on the local policy making 
process was now determined by the local authorities who could either involve them as 
partners or seek alternative sources of expertise (Grémion, 1992, Duran and Thœnig, 1996). 
 
The tensions caused by the effects of Europeanisation and decentralisation together with the 
growing influence of NPM principles and practices generated pressures for administrative 
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reform. Reforms undertaken between 1981-88 highlighted the growing influence of 
managerial concepts (Albertini 2000, Chevallier 1988, Stevens 1988).  During the 1980s, 
French administrative reform programmes were characterised by an increased emphasis on 
administration-user relations; a drive to improve the quality and efficiency of public service 
provision, and an attempt to encourage the active involvement of public officials in the 
reform process (Chevallier 1988). From 1981 onwards, there was a gradual move away 
from the traditional top-down approach to change that was shaped and overseen by the 
policy making elite, to one where the lower administrative levels (the field services) were 
key determinants of the outcomes of the reforms (de Montricher 1996). 
 
These pressures for change informed the 1989-92 Public Service Renewal and the 1995-97 
Reform of the State administrative reform programmes.  The Public Service Renewal 
programme, introduced by Michel Rocard’s government in February 1989, identified public 
officials and front line services, particularly at field service level, as providing the main 
impetus for change (Circulaire du 23 février 1989). Accordingly, managerial 
responsibilities were to be transferred to front line services at field service level to permit its 
managers greater autonomy in their operational management to effect the necessary 
changes. Traditionally, field service officials had felt marginalised from the reform process 
owing to their subservient role within the administrative hierarchy. They viewed reform 
processes with suspicion, and associated them with resource cutbacks (Barouch 1995). A 
key challenge for the Public Service Renewal programme was, therefore, the provision of 
incentive mechanisms for public officials, to encourage their active participation in the 
process, a problem compounded by the apparent lack of inducements in existing career 
management structures (Trosa 1996).  
 
The Public Service Renewal programme comprised four main themes. Firstly, a reformed 
work relations policy sought to improve personnel management, training for staff and 
dialogue between management and officials. Secondly, field services were to be delegated 
greater responsibility in budgetary and administrative matters, which would permit the 
services more flexibility and responsibility in their operational management. Greater 
financial autonomy would be promoted by the block allocation of operational budgets, 
whilst increased responsibilities were conferred in real estate and human resource 
management, particularly in the recruitment of administrative staff at local level. Schemes 
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such as service plans (projets de service) and cost centres (centres de responsabilité) 
provided the framework for delegating greater managerial autonomy to the field services, as 
did the increasing use of contracts to define the relations between a central Ministry and its 
field services (Ryckeboër 1992). 
 
The third theme constituted a commitment to evaluate the performance of public services in 
order to strengthen the accountability for both the policy and managerial performance of 
public programmes. An institutionalised and permanent system of evaluation was 
established with an Inter-Ministerial Committee for Evaluation, responsible for co-
ordinating the process and for identifying those services or projects to be evaluated. Finally, 
there was a drive to improve the reception facilities and the quality of service provision to 
users. Services were to be made more user-friendly and accessible to the public through the 
use of new technology, the simplification of administrative procedures, and improved 
reception facilities with a more personalised service. As part of this drive, a Charter for 
Public Services was created in 1992. 
 
The second significant administrative reform programme of this period was the Reform of 
the State introduced by Alain Juppé’s government in July 1995 (Circulaire du 26 juillet 
1995). Although the Reform of the State programme shared common themes with the 
Public Service Renewal reforms, a greater emphasis was placed on improving 
administration-user relations (Silicani, 1996). The reform programmes also differed in their 
respective implementation strategies, with Juppé advocating a centralised approach through 
requiring conformity of administrative services with national norms and prescribed 
procedures (Chevallier 1996, Guyomarch 1999).   
 
The reform measures were structured around three main concepts (Service Public, 1996, 
p7). Firstly, the concept of a more simplified state sought to simplify state structures and 
procedures in order to facilitate public understanding of its processes. Measures included 
the improvement in the response times to public queries and each administrative service 
being required to display a Quality Charter that set out the commitments of the particular 
service to the user through identifying quantitative targets. Secondly, there was a drive to 
achieve a more accessible State to ensure that decisions were taken closer to the local 
communities on whom they impacted. This was to be largely facilitated through further 
 9 
administrative decentralisation in human resource management and a rationalisation in the 
number of field services and corps to ensure more effective personnel management at local 
level.  
 
Finally, the notion of a more responsible State aimed to make the French State more 
accountable for its actions. Field services were to be delegated greater managerial autonomy 
in the operation of their services especially in budgetary matters in order that they could be 
held directly accountable for their performance instead of the central ministry, which would 
assume a more supervisory role. A new appraisal system was envisaged which would assess 
the actual performance of officials. Additional measures sought to minimise the volume of 
regulations emanating from Paris through the prior analysis of a bill’s anticipated impact 
and to maximise the French administration’s real estate through conducting an inventory of 
usage. 
 
In the Field 
 
Both the Public Service Renewal and the Reform of the State programmes viewed the 
ministerial field services as constituting the main impetus to change in what Guyomarch 
(1999) describes as ‘a process of innovation at the periphery’. For the field services, the 
reforms represented a move away from compliance with procedures towards a more 
managerial ethos of attainment of targets. In this way, the reforms represented a cultural 
challenge for the field services in acquiring greater autonomy in their operational 
management and reducing their dependency on the central Ministries (Trosa 1995). The 
reforms envisaged the field services having greater control in determining the means by 
which policy objectives were to be achieved within a policy and resources framework set by 
the central ministry.  
 
We carried out extensive fieldwork investigations in the ministerial field services during the 
period 1996-71. We decided to focus upon the field services because the reform process had 
delegated them greater autonomy in their operational management. As the purpose of the 
empirical research was to ascertain the effects of the French administrative reform process 
on the ministerial field services, we adopted an actor-centred research methodology. Semi-
structured interviews on the reform experiences pertaining to the Public Service Renewal 
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and the Reform of the State programmes were conducted with officials in the regional field 
services of the Education, Agriculture and Infrastructure Ministries situated in the 
Champagne-Ardennes region. The primary source of contact in each field service was the 
official in charge of applying the managerial reforms announced in the Rocard and Juppé 
programmes. These managers were ideally situated to make an assessment of the 
institutional facilitators and impediments to exercising greater managerial autonomy. As a 
means of verifying and extending the testimonies provided by the managers, we gained 
access to other staff from within each field service, as well as members of the wider policy 
community and  - for Education and Infrastructure, though not Agriculture – officials in the 
Parisian headquarters of the ministries.  Most of the data collection was carried between 
May 1996 and January 1997 (Jones, 2003), with follow up interviews conducted with Paris-
based actors at various stages from 1999 to 20042. The method adopted facilitated direct 
comparisons between three policy areas, insofar as our interview schedule posed a number 
of identical questions to functionally equivalent actors in each ministry. 
 
We deliberately chose a small n. case (the three ministries) and used the semi-structured 
interview as our favoured methodological tool. We preferred a qualitative approach based 
on detailed interviews as more appropriate for understanding the actual dynamics of 
administrative change (the research question) than a quantitative approach ill-suited for the 
purpose. Drawing contrasts between three ministries allowed us to identify probable 
commonalities shared by other meso-level public administrations, as well as to identify 
sectorally specific influences in Education, Agriculture and Infrastructure.  By selecting 
Champagne-Ardennes, we chose deliberately to investigate a non-exceptional French 
region.  There is no tradition of strong regional identity, or of peripheral opposition to Paris. 
The territorial structure is rather typical of many of France’s 22 regions. There is 
competition between the regional capital (Châlons-sur-Champagne) and the largest city, 
Reims.  There is a standard degree of institutional rivalry between the regional council, the 
four departmental councils and city structures such as the Reims agglomeration. The 
political opportunity structure was rather representative of mainland France, with the main 
political competition between the centre-left PS, the centre-right UDF and Gaullist (RPR) 
parties and the far-right Front national (FN).  The Champagne-Ardennes region thus 
presented an ideal neutral terrain for observing the activities of the field services.  
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How did we select our three ministries? We chose the Infrastructure Ministry in view of its 
field services’ experience of managerial autonomy since the 1980s. In these circumstances, 
this field service could be expected to be more receptive to the managerial type reforms. We 
selected the Education Ministry on account of the modernisation process undertaken therein 
during the 1980s. Unlike Infrastructure, Education was perceived of as operating within a 
hierarchical and centralised system (Champagne, Cottereau, Dallemagne and Malan 1983). 
Finally, a regional directorate from the Ministry for Agriculture, Food and Fishing was 
selected in view of this ministry experiencing an unpredictable and fluid environment 
owing to the effects of Europeanisation and decentralisation (Granier 1992). Such pressures 
could induce a receptive context to change. We will now present research findings for each 
of the ministries in turn and evaluate whether there has been a convergence with Hood’s 
model of NPM.  
 
The Education Ministry 
 
More than any other, the Education ministry is organised along regional lines. Mainland 
France is divided for educational purposes into 24 sub-national academies, which more or 
less correspond to France’s 22 regions (though there are three academies in the vast Ile-de-
France region). A rector, the minister’s direct representative in the provinces, heads each 
academy (also known as the rectorate). The rectorates are complex organisational structures 
with major service delivery responsibilities. The rectorate in Reims, for example, directly 
employs 400 staff and provides administrative and advisory support for all types of 
educational activity in the region. As the field service of the Education ministry, the 
rectorates ensure that policies are coherent and consistent with guidelines issued by the 
central ministry in Paris. They also endeavour to adapt educational policy to take local 
factors into account and are engaged in a series of relationships with other public, private 
and associative actors.  
 
The Reims rectorate was involved in both the service plan and cost centre schemes under 
the 1989-92 Public Service Renewal programme.  Most interviews within the Education 
ministry took place in 1996 and 1997, with a number of follow up interviews in Paris in 
1999, 2000 and 2004. A summary of the research findings is shown in Figure 1.  What 
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follows is an attempt to reconstruct the main themes emerging from interviews in the field, 
along the lines of the common interview schedule we adopted for the three ministries.  
 
 
Figure 1: Facilitators/Obstacles to Change found in the Rectorate of the Education 
Ministry 
 
OBSTACLE/FACILITATOR IMPACT ON RECTORATE 
Facilitators to Change 
  Globalised budget for operational 
costs 
  Cost centre status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Computerisation 
 
  Increased financial flexibility 
  Greater autonomy for the rectorate in 
setting targets and allocating 
appropriate resources  Improvements in internal 
communication and co-operation  Increased flexibility for divisions in 
determining resources for target 
attainment 
  Enhancement of working practices 
Obstacles to Change 
  Regulatory controls of Finance 
Ministry 
  Budgetary cutbacks 
 
  Civil Service Code 
  Defensive outlook of trade unions 
  Hierarchical relationship with 
Central Ministry 
 
  Minimise financial room for 
manoeuvre 
  Insufficient funds to cover operational 
costs - resourcing shortages 
  Difficulties in motivating staff 
  Traditional perceptions of role upheld 
  Continued dependency on Ministry  Rigidity of regulatory framework  Traditional perceptions of role upheld 
 
Participation in the cost centre scheme enabled the service to exercise greater control over 
its finances through the allocation of a globalised budget to cover operational costs. The 
new funding arrangements afforded the rectorate greater flexibility in its budgetary 
management. As finances were no longer being specifically allocated to certain items of 
expenditure, cross-transfers between budgetary categories were facilitated. Participation in 
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the service plan and cost centre schemes also provided the rectorate with greater flexibility 
in agreeing performance targets with the central Ministry and in determining the means by 
which these were to be achieved. As part of the process of devising targets, each division 
within the rectorate was required to reflect upon its own role and how it contributed to the 
operations of the service as a whole. It was hoped that this would induce greater co-
operation between the divisions, and mark a move away from the traditional 
compartmentalised working practices, though there was no firm evidence that it had 
produced this effect.  
 
More tangible change was noticeable within the operation of the main divisions, which 
were each delegated greater autonomy in determining ways in which the quality of their 
service provision could be improved to the public. Staff in the exams division had used this 
opportunity to carry out an audit on the time spent on responding to outside queries. The 
outcome of the audit was a recommendation that a receptionist be appointed in the light of 
findings showing that 30% of staff’s time was spent responding to queries of this nature. 
Similarly, in the division for inspectors and administrative staff, officials recommended an 
improvement in internal communication channels between the various sections comprising 
the division in order to improve the response time to internal and external queries. 
Respondents found these experiences motivating owing to their perception that they were 
actively contributing to the rectorate’s goal of improving its service to French citizens. 
Computerisation was also found to have had a positive impact on the rectorate’s operations, 
both through enabling the secretary-general to have a better understanding of the service’s 
operations and in permitting officials to undertake projects in their entirety, thereby 
reducing their reliance on the line manager. 
 
 
If  management reform brought some benefits, the reform programmes were severely 
criticised across the rectorate. Firstly, the financial room for manoeuvre afforded under the 
cost centre scheme was minimised by the regulatory controls imposed by the local 
paymaster of the Finance Ministry. The section head of the Financial Affairs division 
referred to how the local paymaster still required a justification for all items of expenditure, 
enhanced budgetary decentralisation notwithstanding. Moreover, the Finance ministry 
insisted upon the need for the rectorate to forecast accurately its predicted expenditure on 
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operational costs (in theory at the discretion of the field service) at the beginning of the 
financial year. The continuing weight of the Finance ministry on the daily operations of the 
Educational field service was resented and undermined the innovation of the cost centre 
scheme. At the same time, budgetary cutbacks were introduced as part of an overall drive to 
reduce public expenditure. As a result, the central ministry reneged on its financial 
commitments to the field service under the cost centre agreement.  This decision made it 
more difficult for the service to achieve its targets within the specified time frame. This 
episode highlighted the problem of ‘pluriannual’ policy initiatives in a context marked by 
the annual budgetary process.  
 
A number of related themes emerged from interviews within the Reims rectorate, three of 
which elucidate the difficulties of implementing public service reform in France. We will 
consider these in order of increasing importance.  First, staff motivation was identified as 
being one major obstacle to successful implementation, since financial shortages often 
resulted in a greater workload being undertaken by fewer personnel.  Second, the trade 
unions were openly suspicious of moves to delegate greater responsibility to the field 
services, fearing this would lead to privatisation and an eroding of the established concept 
of public service. But the main obstacle related to the difficulties felt by permanent officials 
to adapt culturally to exercising greater managerial autonomy, as they were used to 
functioning in a hierarchical relationship with the central ministry. Officials complained of 
a lack of training to cope with new responsibilities and about the volume and complexity of 
regulations emanating from the central ministry that they were required to apply to their 
working practices. Somewhat paradoxically, the growing workload incurred by the new 
regulatory framework served to reinforce traditional perceptions of the field service 
officials’ role as implementers of policy, rather than being innovators at the periphery. This 
image of the limited capacity for policy learning of mid-ranking officials was confirmed by 
sources interviewed in the Paris central ministry from 1999 to 2004. 
 
The Agriculture Ministry 
 
Unlike the Education ministry, the Agriculture ministry in France is not primarily a 
regionalised structure, though it does have a regional service. Most day-to-day negotiations 
occur at the level of the 96 departmental directorates, themselves in close contact with 
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producers, the farming unions, the central divisions of the ministry (and their European 
interlocutors). Nonetheless, the reform of the state programme was applied to regional, as 
well as departmental divisions. In the interests of comparability with Education, we 
focussed our empirical attention on the regional service of the Agriculture ministry in 
Champagne-Ardennes.   
 
Since the 1980s, the field services of the Agriculture ministry have been confronted with an 
unpredictable and increasingly fluid environment (Granier 1992). The 1982 decentralisation 
reforms produced strengthened local authorities that constituted policy-making rivals,  
whilst the effects of Europeanisation, particularly the Common Agriculture Policy, 
gradually shifted core agricultural policy responsibilities to Brussels. The cumulative effect 
of these pressures is that the Agricultural field services are striving for a new identity. They 
face a range of potential futures, with options ranging from being a local technical 
institution at the service of the prefecture, a body charged mainly with implementing 
national and EU directives or a genuine stakeholder in a local or regional policy network. 
Such a state of flux within Agriculture was compounded by the Reform of the State 
proposals to merge the ministry’s field services at department level with the corresponding 
services of the Infrastructure ministry. 
 
Fieldwork investigations were carried in the regional directorate for Agriculture and 
Forestry in Châlons-en-Champagne. The main functions of the regional directorate are the 
co-ordination of agricultural policy in the region and adapting national policies to suit the 
local context. The directorate also plays an important role in the distribution of agricultural 
subsidies and funding, the provision of agricultural training and the regulation and 
supervision of agricultural activities within the region. The research findings for the 
directorate are summarised in Figure 2 below. 
 
Consistent with the actor-centred approach we identified above, we now venture inside the 
regional service of the Agricultural ministry. As in Education, the main benefit of the 
reforms cited by the regional director and his deputy was the allocation of a globalised 
budget to cover operational costs.  Such budgetary decentralisation had the potential to 
permit cross-transfers between budgetary categories and enabled the directorate to have 
more control in the deployment of its resources. The regional director also pointed to 
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greater autonomy in human resource management through having greater discretion in 
determining salary levels, providing the length of service and the grade of a particular 
official were taken into account, and through being able to determine the choice of 
department for a new member of staff.  
 
 
Figure 2: Facilitators/Obstacles to Change found in the regional directorate for 
Agriculture and Forestry.  
 
OBSTACLE/FACILITATOR IMPACT ON DIRECTORATE 
Facilitators to Change 
  Globalised budget for operational 
costs 
 
  Greater autonomy in human resource 
management 
 
 
  Greater flexibility in financial 
management  
  More control over staff  
 
 
Obstacles to Change 
  Regulatory controls of Finance 
Ministry 
  Budgetary cutbacks 
 
 
  Civil Service Code 
  Defensive outlook of trade unions 
  Hierarchical relationship with 
Central Ministry 
 
  Minimise financial room for 
manoeuvre 
  Insufficient funds to cover operational 
costs and basic operations  Staff disillusionment with reform 
process 
  Lack of incentives for staff  
  Traditional perceptions of role upheld 
  Interference in operational 
management  Rigidity of regulatory framework  Traditional perceptions of role upheld 
 
 
However, in the view of most respondents in the directorate, regulatory controls and severe 
resourcing shortages negated these benefits. The requirement for detailed budgetary 
forecasting and the need for subsequent revisions to require the approval of the local 
paymaster minimised any financial room for manoeuvre afforded by the globalised budgets 
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for operational costs. Furthermore, both the regional director and his deputy maintained that 
budgetary cutbacks impeded the directorate’s capacity to discharge even its core 
responsibilities, let alone any new initiatives. Not only did the directorate had difficulty in 
paying its heating and telephone bills, but staff who transferred to other services or who 
retired were not being replaced. In ten years, the number of staff working in the directorate 
had fallen from 75 to its level (in 1996) of 35. Furthermore, the budgetary cutbacks had 
affected the ability of the directorate to apply key aspects of the reform programmes to its 
operations. This was particularly evident in relation to the drive to improve reception 
facilities, where financial shortages had forced to regional director to cut back on the 
receptionist post in the service. 
 
According to all respondents, the budgetary cutbacks had a serious effect on the morale of 
staff,  making it difficult for the officials in the directorate to undertake all the functions that 
were required of them. There was disillusionment with the reform process amongst staff 
because of its association with dwindling resources. There was also a lack of incentives for 
participation in the reform process, with the regional director arguing that the civil service 
code provided little discretion to reward hard working officials. Under the current appraisal 
system, length of service and grade still remained the key criteria for promotion, with 
minimal inducement for officials to strive to improve their performance. Respondents 
pointed to how this system was upheld by the trade unions, justified by the doctrine of 
equality of opportunity and treatment amongst officials.  
 
The directorate continued to maintain a hierarchical relationship with its central ministry. 
The deputy director maintained that the unfamiliarity of central officials with the working 
conditions at field service level contributed to the complex and growing volumes of 
regulations, especially in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy and consumer 
protection. This lent itself to a continued dependency on the central Ministry for advice and 
information in interpreting and applying directives. Respondents in the directorate affirmed 
that the central Ministry continued to emphasise compliance with procedures, which 
provided it with a justification for constant interference in the service’s operational 
management. Such a scenario reinforced the status quo and minimised any opportunity for 
the directorate to exercise greater autonomy in its operational management. 
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The Infrastructure Ministry 
 
During the period of post-war economic and urban expansion, the Infrastructure ministry 
occupied a powerful position in the ministerial hierarchy. The technical expertise of its 
services traditionally promoted a sense of pride amongst its agents  (Thoenig 1973). By the 
nature of its activity, the Infrastructure ministry has always had a powerful territorial 
presence, its role being both as a direct service delivery agency (building roads and bridges, 
town planning) and as a source of recognised technical expertise for French local 
authorities.  Its territorial divisions are very closely associated with the operation of the 
technical grands corps (Mines, Highways and Bridges), ensuring the interests of the 
ministry are permanently relayed to the central French state machinery. 
 
The infrastructure ministry has also had a long tradition of administrative innovation. Even 
before the 1982 decentralisation reforms, the ministry had engaged its own processes of 
contractualisation between the central divisions and its regional and departmental divisions. 
More than any other, Infrastructure has been proactive in attempting to safeguard its 
positions, that have been openly challenged by successive decentralisation reforms. It was 
able to anticipate and integrate the 1989-92 Service Reform programmes in a far less 
problematical way than either Education or Agriculture.  
 
Most data collection took place in the regional directorate of the Infrastructure ministry 
based in Châlons-en-Champagne.  The role of the regional directorate was to formulate 
technical policies in construction, planning and highways maintenance,  as well as having 
responsibility for the distribution of state funds in infrastructure, housing and town 
planning. In addition, the regional directorate worked closely with local businesses on 
industrial policies and socio-economic development and with local authorities in terms of 
road construction. The empirical research collected from the regional directorate is shown 
in Figure 3. 
 
 
The regional director cited two main benefits of the reforms. Firstly, the provision of a 
globalised budget to cover operational costs facilitated the transfer of funds between 
budgetary categories to cover any anticipated shortfalls. The directorate had the potential to 
devise new resourcing combinations that would underpin those areas of strategic priority for 
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the service. Secondly, the directorate was delegated greater responsibility in managing its 
administrative staff in respect of their appraisals, promotion boards and disciplinary 
procedures now being conducted at local level. There was also an increased emphasis on 
training for staff to enable them to contend with their newly allocated responsibilities. The 
regional director pointed out that the directorate was receptive to the application of private 
sector practices to its operations, as envisaged by the respective reform programmes, owing 
to its close working relationship with private businesses.  
 
Figure 3: Facilitators/Obstacles to Change found in the regional directorate for 
Infrastructure.  
 
OBSTACLE/FACILITATOR IMPACT ON DIRECTORATE 
Facilitators to Change 
  Modernisation programme undertaken 
during 1980s in Ministry 
  Globalised budget for operational costs 
 
  Greater autonomy in human resource 
management 
  Collaborative work with local businesses 
 
  Previous experience of managerial 
autonomy in operations 
  Less compartmentalisation between 
budgetary items - facilitate cross-transfers  
  More control over administrative staff in 
relation to appraisals, promotions 
  More receptive to private sector practices  
 
Obstacles to Change 
  Regulatory controls of Finance Ministry 
  Budgetary cutbacks 
 
 
  Staff disillusionment with reform 
process 
 
 
 
  Defensive outlook of trade unions 
 
 
 
 
  Minimise financial room for manoeuvre 
  Difficulty in sustaining core operations 
and collaborative work with local 
businesses  
  Less inclination to participate owing to 
lack of visible progress  Inability to participate in reform working 
groups due to increased workloads  Rigidity of regulatory framework 
  Unions’ reluctance to endorse further 
delegations of managerial autonomy to 
local level  
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As with the examples of Education and Agriculture, the regional director for Infrastructure 
regretted that the financial room for manoeuvre afforded by globalised budgets for 
operational costs was offset by a combination of the regulatory controls imposed by the 
Finance Ministry and budgetary cutbacks. The directorate was required to submit detailed 
plans on its proposed budgetary expenditure for the next financial year, with subsequent 
revisions necessitating the approval of the local paymaster. The budgetary cutbacks 
experienced by the directorate entailed difficulties for the service in discharging its core 
responsibilities, which was particularly problematic in the light of the collaborative work 
undertaken with local businesses. Accordingly, one technician interviewed feared that such 
cutbacks would undermine his unit’s reputation for innovation and high quality work, 
which might lead local businesses to look elsewhere for technical support. Nevertheless, the 
regional director claimed that the directorate’s previous experience of budgetary autonomy 
and exposure to private sector practices made it better equipped than field services in other 
Ministries in contending with resourcing shortages. 
 
Budgetary cutbacks increased the workload amongst declining numbers of staff. The 
officials interviewed complained that increasing volumes of work precluded their 
participation in the working groups that were set up to discuss how the reform measures 
would apply to the directorate’s operations. Respondents claimed that a key source of their 
growing workload were the difficulties in adapting centrally devised directives to the local 
context. Their main contention, not shared by the regional director, was that the central 
ministry had unrealistic expectations of its field services in terms of the staffing and 
resources available at this level. The situation was compounded by the increase in 
regulatory controls to which the directorate was subjected to ensure that the service was 
discharging its responsibilities in accordance with the expectations of the central ministry.  
 
The regional division of the Infrastructure ministry was the most independent and 
innovative of our sample. Its ability to develop a territorial focus was strengthened by the 
nature of its policy activity (bringing Infrastructure into daily contact with local and 
regional authorities), by its location within local communities, as well as its powerful 
position within the French State. Ultimately, the Infrastructure ministry is more threatened 
than either Education or Agriculture by the related movements of decentralisation (which 
empowers other authorities and agencies) and Europeanisation (especially EU competition 
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policy which has opened up public tenders).  Complying with the spirit of the Public 
Service and Reform of the State programmes made organisational sense, as it could only 
enhance the ministries’ reputation for efficiency and technical expertise.  
 
 
Evaluation of Research Findings 
 
In the introduction we set out to investigate whether public administration in France has 
converged with those in a majority of OECD countries in adopting the norms of New Public 
Management. We took the model of NPM as outlined by Hood (1991) as our benchmark, 
emphasising the importance of managerial autonomy, targets and performance criteria, 
decentralised management structures, competition to lower costs, the use of private sector 
management techniques and financial parsimony.   
 
The Public Service Renewal and Reform of the State programmes were designed to 
enhance the managerial autonomy of the field services, notably through introducing more 
financial and organisational decentralisation and through agreeing common targets in 
contracts. While there was support for management reforms from government and from 
some high-ranking civil servants, there was stiff resistance from middle-ranking officials in 
the field services. We identified a number of features common to each ministry. There was 
a new management discourse that bore superficial resemblance to NPM discourses 
elsewhere. On the other hand, certain themes of NPM were clearly beyond the pale, such as 
performance related pay criteria, the explicit reference to private sector management 
techniques or the valorisation of competition for its own sake. The capacity of the 
ministerial field services to engage in the reform process was constrained by the resilience 
of traditional institutional features within the French administrative system, features that 
were particularly marked at the meso-level.  The regulatory controls imposed by the 
Finance Ministry served to minimise the financial room for manoeuvre of the field services 
vis-à-vis their operational costs. The civil service code offered little incentive to officials to 
participate actively in the process and ensured that issues of pay and service were not 
related to performance. In each of these ministries, strong public sector trade unions kept 
terms and conditions of service of officials under close scrutiny.  There was little inclination 
from middle-ranking officials to comply with these new organisational norms.   The drive 
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to reform public service became equated, in a negative sense, with dwindling public 
resources. Low staff morale diminished the chances of effective implementation.  
 
On the other hand, our survey revealed some evidence that the field services are gradually 
becoming accustomed to exercising greater managerial autonomy and applying managerial 
practices to their operations. They no longer exist in such a hierarchical relationship with 
their central ministries. A more sophisticated analysis needs to differentiate between the 
three ministries, as well as identifying features common to all of them. In addition to the 
internal dynamics and attitudes specific to each service, the capacity of the field services to 
adopt a proactive approach to management reform depended on a number of variables, of 
which we identify four main ones: the attitude of the central services to meso-level 
autonomy; the degree of institutional receptivity to change;  the type of service delivery, and 
the extent of penetration in local networks.  
 
The attitude of central services to meso-level autonomy was vital. Irrespective of the law, 
central ministries varied in their willingness to allow the field services’ greater managerial 
autonomy and to move away from traditionally hierarchical relationships (Fraisse 1992). 
While Infrastructure had a long tradition of innovation, the Agriculture and Education 
ministries provided ample evidence of the resilience of traditional institutional features. In 
Education, for example, rival central divisions and the Minister’s office (cabinet) routinely 
interfered in field service operations by maintaining specific contacts with their 
corresponding divisions or contacts on the ground. In this way, the compartmentalisation 
(cloissonnement) of the French administrative system was played out at the meso-level, 
making regional co-ordination and the development of more autonomous forms of 
management very difficult. 
 
The capacity of the field services to engage in management reforms testified to a diversity 
in receptivity to change within the French administrative system. We were sensitive to the 
diversity of approaches adopted on the ground by the field services of the different 
Ministries. In response to the 1982-83 decentralisation reforms, several ministries 
undertook modernisation programmes at field service level. Field service managers in the 
Infrastructure ministry, for instance, were delegated greater managerial autonomy in 
budgetary and human resource management from 1983, within the framework of a 
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contractual agreement with the central ministry (Duran 1993, Pavé 1992). Similarly, the 
Education ministry delegated increased budgetary autonomy, more flexible human resource 
management and greater control over pedagogical direction to its regional field services, the 
rectorates (Cole, 1997).  In the new institutionalist tradition, these organisational 
inheritances are important variables. Those ministries that had engaged in reform processes 
prior to the introduction of the Public Service Renewal programme in 1989 found it much 
easier to implement change than others.  Infrastructure was the most dynamic, followed by 
Education and Agriculture.  
 
The type of service delivery is another important variable. Clark (1998) contends that the 
field services of those ministries engaged in business-type activities are more susceptible to 
managerial reforms than those ministries involved in purely administrative functions. 
Infrastructure has always had close relationships with the private sector and local 
government, bringing its agents into contact with decision-makers beyond central 
government. Education has by far the most sizeable field services, making it the most 
similar to a classic bureaucratic organisation. While size reduces proximity, the type of 
service delivery – curriculum design, teacher mobility, demography, inspection – ensures 
that the Education ministry operates in an interdependent policy space. The search for more 
efficient management practices is the counterpart to the development of closer inter-
organisational relationships. In most French regions, good working relationships have 
developed between the academies and the regional authorities, bringing many Education 
officials into daily contact with local and regional politicians and pressure groups. The 
Agricultural ministry stands apart from the others. Its ability to develop a specifically 
regional policy is limited by the nature of the policy sector (agriculture being a 
Europeanised domain), by the EU, by the national and departmental focus of farm pressure 
group activity and by the relative weakness of agriculture as a territorial department (35 
officials in Champagne-Ardennes, against over 400 for Education).  
 
Closely related to service delivery, the proximity to local or regional policy networks is 
another important variable. The development of a regional public sphere is an essential 
feature of sub-central French governance. By regional public sphere, we signify an arena 
within which a plurality of organisations interacts. These include local and regional 
authorities (empowered since the early 1980s), regional prefectures, the regional field 
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services of central ministries, as well as associations organised on a regional basis and 
social partners. These organisations come together in a variety of formal (contractual) and 
informal ways. The precise nature of relationships varies across different sub-central spaces, 
a theme of analysis that goes beyond the current exercise. The influence of field services 
depends not only upon the vertical relationships they maintain within their ministries, but 
also upon the degree to which they are embedded within local (especially city) and regional 
communities. This degree of embeddedness is more important for certain ministries than 
others. Infrastructure, Education and Agriculture each maintain distinctive relationships 
with their client groups and there is some evidence that these vary in different places. Good 
inter-organisational relationships can determine whether the local authorities involve the 
field services as partners (essential for the Infrastructure ministry) or else seek alternative 
sources of expertise (Grémion, 1992). Some field services have made considerable efforts 
to establish themselves as legitimate actors in the eyes of local actors (Duran and Thœnig, 
1996). 
 
These combined trends were most visible in the Infrastructure Ministry, where the field 
services had the most prior experience of exercising greater autonomy in their operational 
management, together with a history of good collaboration with businesses and local 
authorities. The Infrastructure Ministry was more receptive to management change than 
either Education or Agriculture, a receptivity that reflects the institutional diversity of the 
French administrative system. Innovation was somewhat weaker in the field services of the 
Education and (especially) Agriculture Ministries. But there was evidence of cultural 
change within both ministries. The Public Service Renewal and the Reform of the State 
programmes provided these field services with experience of having greater control in their 
operational management, especially in financial and human resource matters. This 
symbolised a move away from a traditional mindset of dependency on the central Ministries 
towards one where the field services could exercise greater autonomy in their operational 
management and be held more accountable for their own actions. Our research findings 
highlighted the incremental nature of such a transformation. 
 
We reject a straightforward convergence model. Countries faced with comparable pressures 
often adopt dissimilar responses consistent with their own political and institutional 
traditions. The ideological underpinnings of the NPM debate do not find a receptive terrain 
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in French public administration.  At the very least, management changes need to be 
domesticated before they enter into the domestic acquis. On the other hand, many of the 
underlying themes of the NPM are also applicable to French public administration. The 
language of performance targets is not that of French public administration, for instance, 
but that of contracts, partnerships and joint projects is. The substantive developments 
uncovered by these rival concepts are not fundamentally dissimilar: how to bring public 
administration closer to citizens, how to improve service delivery, how to increase 
efficiency and to improve inter-organisational relations. Case-specific factors (such as the 
ideology of public service, the civil service code or the honeycomb organisation of the 
French state) are clearly important and mediate the influence of the new public management 
paradigm. To this extent, we agree with Hood (1995) that countries will only select those 
aspects of the NPM agenda that correspond to their own specific institutional context.  The 
direction of change, however, is, on balance, rather similar in France to comparable 
countries.  
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